The diagnosis of CPTSD is related to the biologization of mental health
The debate around the diagnosis of CPTSD (Complex Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder) is a product of the “biologization” of mental health. As happens in many fields, psychiatry has been swept up in waves of hopeful beliefs that biology and the tools of medicine (medical diagnostics like blood tests, brain scans, standardized clinical observations, and genetic testing, as well as medical interventions like pharmaceuticals) will ultimately come to treat and cure—or at least manage—what we (with great hopefulness) understand as biologically grounded forms of distress.
We are, in many ways, still riding the wave that began with Prozac with that iconic Newsweek cover, which declared Prozac not just a breakthrough treatment for depression but expressed a promise that all mental suffering could be cured by such treatment. There’s a problem here for Prozac itself. We’ve since learned that Prozac and the class of antidepressants that imitate it aren’t nearly as effective as we believed (wished) they were. But there is a separate, less discussed problem: the hefty task of deciding what sorts of life experiences should be considered mental suffering and therefore, in the category of life experiences that we should consider biological, meaning holding the prospect of being treated in a manner (we hoped) depression could be treated.